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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AS LEAD
PLAINTIFFS: IS THERE A NEW AND
CHANGING LANDSCAPE?
MAx W. BERGER, JOHN P. ("SEAN") COFFEY AND GERALD H. SILK

INTRODUCTION

Six years ago, an institutional investor would no more have
considered seeking a position as "lead plaintiff' in charge of
prosecuting a securities class action lawsuit than it would have
predicted that a start-up Internet company such as Yahoo! could
trade at one time for more than $135 per share, or at almost 350
times its earnings. The institutional investor's perspective
changed, however, in December 1995, when Congress, over
President Clinton's veto, enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (the "Reform Act")' to curb perceived
abuses in securities class action litigation, and to encourage
institutional investors, such as public pension funds, to serve as
lead plaintiffs in such cases. 2 The purpose of this Article is to
explore the lead plaintiff provisions of the Reform Act, to analyze
the evolving legal landscape regarding application of the Reform
Act, and to consider the impact of the Reform Act and caselaw on
institutional investors' involvement in securities class actions.
Indeed, the recent settlements of the In re Cendant Corp.
Litigation3 demonstrate the importance of institutional investor
leadership in securities class actions. There, the court appointed
the California Public Employees' Retirement System, the New
t Max W. Berger is a senior partner of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP, and co-counsel to the Public Pension Fund Group in the Cendant Litigation
and the New York State Common Retirement Fund in the McKesson HBOC
Litigation. Sean Coffey is a partner of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP
and Gerald H. Silk is an associate at the firm.
1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 743, 758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1999)).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
3 109 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D.N.J. 2000).
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York State Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City
Pension Funds, as lead plaintiffs for the class, achieving
groundbreaking results. Cendant agreed to pay $2,832,500,000
in cash-more than three times the highest recovery ever
previously obtained in a securities class action, and
approximately ten times the recovery in the next largest
securities
class
action involving
fraudulent
financial
statements-and agreed to far-reaching and unprecedented,
corporate governance changes.4 Additionally, Ernst & Young,
the independent auditor of CUC International, Inc. 5 and of
Cendant's CMS subsidiary, agreed to pay $335,000,000 in cash,
which is the largest amount an accounting firm has paid to settle
a securities class action. The total of the two settlements is at
least $3,167,500,000, by far the largest cash settlement ever
achieved in a securities class action. 6 The active participation of
these significant shareholders undoubtedly enhanced the value
of the settlements to the investor class and validated Congress'
intent in enacting the Reform Act.
I.

THE REFORM ACT
The Reform Act embodies Congress' intention to facilitate
the appointment of institutions as lead plaintiffs in shareholder
class action lawsuits.7
In that connection, the Reform Act
requires courts to adopt the presumption "that the most
adequate plaintiff [to serve as a lead plaintiff] ...is the person
or group of persons that.. . in the determination of the court,
has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the
class" and who "otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."8 This presumption may
be rebutted only by proof that the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff (1) will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of
4 Cendant also agreed to share 50% of any recovery it or its officers and
directors obtained in their separate ongoing litigation against Ernst &Young.
5 CUC International, Inc merged with HFS, Inc. in December 1997 to become
Cendant.
6 See Cendant, 109 F. Supp 2d at 304.
7 See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that Congress expressly
stated that the intent of the legislation is "to increase the likelihood that parties
with significant holdings in issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned with
the class of shareholders, will participate in the litigation and exercise control over
the selection and actions of plaintiffs counsel").
8 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (1999).
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the class, or (2) is subject to unique defenses foreclosing
adequate representation of the class. 9
The Reform Act was intended to eliminate the widespread
and well-known "race to the courthouse." 10 Prior to the Reform
Act, the lead plaintiff position in a securities class action was
typically awarded to the first plaintiff to file a complaint against
the defendant.'1 Most of the time, control over the litigation
vested in plaintiffs who had very small holdings in the defendant
company and were, in turn, controlled by their lawyers, who
often filed complaints within twenty-four hours of a negative
announcement regarding the defendant company. In contrast,
under the Reform Act, the first plaintiff to file a complaint must
publish notice within twenty (20) days of such filing to identify
the claims and the class and to advise class members of their
right to move to serve as lead plaintiff in the action within sixty
(60) days from the date of publication of the notice. 12 Within
ninety (90) days of the publication of notice, the court is required
to "appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the
purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be the most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members...." 13 Finally, "Itlhe most adequate plaintiff shall,
subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to
represent the class."14
These changes were intended to give institutional plaintiffs,
among others, time to assess the merits of securities cases more
carefully, determine whether to prosecute a particular case, and
to choose the most adequate and qualified counsel for the task.15
As explained more fully below, however, the "race to the
courthouse" that the Reform Act intended to eliminate still exists
today, only now in a different form. The new law has given
many of the traditional plaintiffs' law firms the ability to
communicate early in the process with any number of
shareholders by securing a single small shareholder plaintiff in a
case and publishing notice, either over a news wire service, the
9 See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
10 See CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 2, at 33.
11

See id.

12 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(I)-(II)

(1999); see also CONFERENCE REPORT,

supra note 2, at 33.
13 Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i); see also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 34.

14 Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
15 See CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 2, at 33-35.
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Internet, or both, with the intent to attract responses from other
shareholders. This notice publication thus acts as a massive de
facto solicitation of plaintiffs for these law firms, the very same
firms that Congress sought to "reign in" in the securities
litigation arena. The solicitation gives these firms the ability to
aggregate hundreds of otherwise unaffiliated shareholder
plaintiffs in an attempt to come up with the "group" who has the
largest financial interest in a case, along with the ability to
ultimately secure a position as lead counsel. In some cases, this
has led to arguably absurd results. For example, in In re
Informix Corp. Securities Litigation,i 6 two groups of aggregated
individuals (one of 979 and another of 274) competed for
7
appointment as lead plaintiff.'
Moreover, some of the Reform Act's fundamental goals
arguably have been undermined by this new race to the
courthouse. For example, the Reform Act intended that clients
would seek out and choose their counsel, not, as is the case with
aggregation, that counsel would seek out clients through a
massive solicitation campaign. In addition, the Reform Act's
lead plaintiff provisions, which Congress drafted to "encourage
institutional investors to take a more active role in securities
class action lawsuits," were intended to vest control of the
litigation in the hands of the clients, not the lawyers.' 8 Such a
"group" of unrelated, aggregated individuals will have difficulty
exercising any degree of meaningful control over their counsel.
II. APPLICATION OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISIONS
Although the Reform Act sets forth a number of standards
for selection of lead plaintiffs, the criterion that has sparked the
most controversy is the presumption that the "person or group of
persons" with the largest financial interest in the case is most
adequate for appointment as lead plaintiff' i9
The courts,
commentators, and the SEC all seem to agree that the
interpretation of the Reform Act's "group of persons" term is the
most important open question regarding the lead plaintiff
provisions. 20 The debate centers on what Congress meant by
16 No. C-97-1289-SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23867 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1997).
17 See id. at *8 n.2.
18 CONFERENCE REPORT,

supra note 2, at 34.

19

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (1999).

20

Id. at § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
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"group of persons" and whether the gathering of so many
individuals who had little or no affiliation prior to the litigation
will advance the aims Congress had in mind when it created the
lead plaintiff provisions.
In several early Reform Act cases, some courts took a strict
view of the Reform Act language, and refused to read into the
wording of the statute a numerical limitation on how many
persons could be in a group. This was particularly so in cases in
which only one lead plaintiff motion was filed on behalf of a
"group" of otherwise unrelated investors. 21 In other early cases,
however, some courts took the other extreme, rejecting
aggregated plaintiffs and opting for a single lead plaintiff.22 In
addition, in these early cases, when institutions moved to
assume the role of lead plaintiff, courts were generally quick to
enforce Congress' preference for institutional investors to serve
23
as lead plaintiffs.
As time progressed and courts became more familiar with
the Reform Act's lead plaintiff provisions, courts began staking
out positions somewhere between these two extremes, although
much closer to the latter view. Concerned that some proposed
lead plaintiff structures may be too complex and therefore
ineffective in controlling counsel, courts have been more inclined
to reject groups with large numbers of investors, even when no
one else has filed a competing lead plaintiff motion. In Chill v.
Green Tree FinancialCorp.,24 for example, the court rejected the
21See, e.g., In re Ride, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-97-402WD, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23689, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 1997) ("On its face this language calls for
aggregation. Any suggestion to the contrary, based on legislative history, cannot
prevail against the statute's plain wording."); In re Read-Rite Corp. Sec. Litig., No.
C-97-20059RMW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. May 27,
1997) ("Although the plain language of the Act does not expressly allow or prohibit
such a pooling of shares, nothing in the text prevents the aggregation of shares by
the Proposed Lead Plaintiffs to constitute the largest financial interest."); D'Hondt
v. Digital, Inc., No. CIV 97-5 JRT RLE, 1997 WL 405668, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 3,
1997 ("Jn our view, when, as here, the putative class may total in the hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, an arbitrary limit on the number of proposed Lead
Plaintiffs would be unrealistic, if not wholly counterproductive.").
22 See, e.g., In re Donnkenny Inc. Securities Litigation, 171 F.R.D. 156, 157
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("To allow an aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs to serve as lead
plaintiff defeats the purpose of choosing a lead plaintiff.").
23 See, e.g., Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
("IWihere the interest of one institutional investor in the litigation far exceeds the
interests of the other purported plaintiffs, nothing persuades the Court to appoint
co-Lead [sic] Plaintiffs.").
24 181 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 1998).
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appointment of a group of approximately 300 investors on the
ground that their appointment "would threaten the interests of
the class, would subvert the intent of Congress, and would be too
unwieldy to allow for the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of [the] action."25 Explaining that a case-by-case,
"rule of reason" analysis is appropriate, the court instead
appointed the six members of the proposed group who had the
largest losses as lead plaintiffs. 26 In this and other cases in
which courts have whittled down the number of plaintiffs for the
leadership role, the rationale is that the fewer the plaintiffs, the
more likely they are to exercise meaningful control over the
27
case.
When institutional investors have been appointed lead
plaintiffs in securities class actions, the appointments often
came only after defeating significant challenges from other
would-be, primarily non-institutional, lead plaintiff applicants.
For example, in In re Cendant Corp. Litigation,28 fifteen separate
plaintiffs or plaintiff groups sought appointment as lead plaintiff
despite the fact that a single group consisting of the California
Public Employees' Retirement System, the New York State
Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City Pension
Funds (collectively, the "Public Pension Fund Group")
unquestionably had the largest financial interest in the case,
suffering combined losses in excess of $89 milhon. 29 Each of the
fifteen would-be lead plaintiff groups proffered creative
arguments in an attempt to unseat the Public Pension Fund
Group and secure the lead plaintiff position for itself.30 For
example, one group argued that the determination of which
group has the "largest financial interest in the relief sought by
the class" 3i should be based upon a "proportionality" analysis,
e.g., an investor with a net worth of $5,000 who suffered a $1,000
25 Id. at 408.
26 Id. at 409.
27 See, e.g., In

re Advanced Tissue Sciences Securities Litigation, 184 F.R.D.
346, 352-53 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (competing groups consisted entirely of hundreds of
unrelated individual investors; noting that neither group contained a pension fund
or institutional investor, the court rejected each group and exercised supervisory
authority to select sub-group of six investors offered as alternative for lead
plaintiffs).
28 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998).
29 See id. at 146-47.
30 See id. at 147.
31 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i)

(1999).
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loss would be regarded as having a greater financial interest
than an institution with combined assets of $10 billion that lost
$50 million. 32 Other groups argued that institutions still holding
investments in Cendant could not adequately represent class
members who had sold their stock after the fraud was
disclosed. 33 After a hearing on these motions, however, the Court
34
appointed the Public Pension Fund Group as lead plaintiffs.
Interestingly, the Public Pension Fund Group was not the first to
file an action in the Cendant case, in fact, it did not even file an
action at all before moving for lead plaintiff status. The Public
Pension Fund Group's appointment was nonetheless proper
because, under the Reform Act, in order to be considered by the
court for the lead plaintiff position, a plaintiff need only file a
complaint or move to be appointed lead plaintiff. 35
In Gluck v. Cellstar Corp.,36 a group of aggregated
individuals and entities (the "Group") competed with the State of
Wisconsin Investment Board ("SWIB"), an entity with the
largest financial interest in the case, for the lead plaintiff
position, and, in the alternative, sought appointment as co-lead
plaintiff with SWIB. 37 Rejecting the Group's challenge, the court
in Cellstar found that SWIB was well-suited to adequately
represent the class. 38 The court found that SWIB had the largest
financial interest in the case and, as an institutional investor,
had experience acting as a fiduciary, in both investment and
39
financial matters, which would only benefit the class.
Interestingly, with respect to the Group's contention that SWIB
was not an adequate or typical class representative, as required
by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
found that "Congress clearly did not intend to burden
prospective Lead Plaintiffs by requiring extensive evidentiary
proof of typicality or adequacy in a 'Reform Act' designed to
reduce the costs of securities class actions and to induce
institutional investors to become Lead Plaintiffs." 40
32 Cendant, 182 F.R.D. at 147.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 146.

35 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)iii)(Xaa)-(cc) (1999).
36 976 F. Supp. 542 (D. Tex. 1997).
37 See id. at 545.
38 See id. at 545-50.

39 See id. at 546.
40 Id.
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In addition, with respect to the Group's attempt to become a
co-lead plaintiff with SWIB, the court held that, under the
Reform Act's procedures, "where the interest of one institutional
investor in the litigation far exceeds the interests of other
purported plaintiffs, nothing persuades the Court to appoint coLead Plaintiffs." 41 The court found that appointing co-lead
plaintiffs would frustrate "one of the principal goals" of the
Reform Act, which is "to remove 'repeat-player' plaintiffs'
lawyers from the control of securities litigation and to vest
control with large investors." 42 Accordingly, the Court appointed
43
SWIB as lead plaintiff.
In contrast to the Cendant and Cellstar courts, other courts
have been responsive to arguments from aggregated shareholder
groups seeking appointment as lead plaintiff or co-lead plaintiff
with an institutional investor. For example, in In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Securities Litigation,44 a case arising out of,
among other things, Oxford's financial deterioration from its
failure to disclose problems with its computer system and
revenue recognition practices, the court appointed the following
three competing plaintiffs and plaintiff groups as co-lead
plaintiffs: (1) the Public Employee's Retirement Association of
Colorado (ColPERA), which suffered a loss of $20 million, (2) an
aggregated group of individual investors called the "Vogel
Group," who suffered a loss of $10 million, and (3) the PBHG
Fund, a private institution consisting of growth mutual funds,
45
which had suffered a loss of approximately $3 million.
Declining to appoint ColPERA-the plaintiff with the
largest loss of all would-be lead plaintiffs in the case-as sole
lead plaintiff, the court noted that the language of the Reform
Act "expressly contemplates the appointment of more than one
lead plaintiff."46 The court also found that the class could benefit
from a balanced mix of individuals and institutions, and that
such a structure "provides the proposed class with the
47
substantial benefits of joint decision-making and joint funding."
Thus, the court held that:
Id. at 550.
Id. at 549.
43 See id. at 550.
4 182 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
45 See id. at 44-45, 51.
46 Id. at 47.
47 Id. at 45.
41
42
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The use of multiple lead plaintiffs will best serve the interests
of the proposed class... because such a structure will allow for
pooling, not only of the knowledge and experience, but also of
the resources of the plaintiffs' counsel in order to support what
48
could prove to be a costly and time-consuming litigation.

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has
expressed its opposition to the practice of appointing competing
would-be lead plaintiffs. In Oxford Health Plans,it submitted an
amicus curiae brief to the court in support of ColPERA's
appointment as lead plaintiff and in opposition to the
appointment of competing would-be lead plaintiffs. 49 In arguing
that there was no basis or precedent to support the appointment
of competing groups of plaintiffs with separate counsel as co-lead
plaintiffs, the SEC stated that "[allowing the appointment of
multiple plaintiffs would disperse control of the litigation and
thus undercut the objective of the [Reform] Act's lead plaintiff
provisions." 50

While courts have reduced widely varying rulings in
applying the Reform Act's lead plaintiff provisions, a truly
Kafka-esque ruling threatened to yield a bizarre and wholly
injudicious result in Laperriere v. Vesta Insurance Group, Inc.51
In that case, the Florida State Board of Administration and
plaintiff groups consisting of aggregated individuals or entities
were competing for appointment as lead plaintiff.52 The court
held that, because it was "unable and/or unwilling to decide
between the competing plaintiff groups," it would "do the
unprecedented and declare a tie to be resolved by the tossing of a
coin."53 The court also declined to appoint the institution and
individual investors as co-lead plaintiffs, finding the approach
taken by Judge Brieant in Oxford Health Plans to be
"unsatisfactory."54 In a "separate coin-tossing order," the court
provided: "A designee of the Florida Group shall call 'Heads' or
'Tails' while the coin is in the air."55 Perhaps, recognizing the
48

Id. at 46.

49 See id. at 47-49 (citing Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange

Commission, Amicus Curiae dated May 20, 1998 ("SEC Memorandum")).
60 See SEC Memorandum at 3.
51 No. 98-AR-1407 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 1998).
52 See id. (Memorandum Opinion) at 5-7.
63 Id. at 7.
54 Id.

65 Id. (Orders) at 6.
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absurdity of its decision, the court's order specifically provided
that if either party wished "to file a petition for mandamus
seeking to prevent the selection of a lead plaintiff group by this
method, the coin toss will be postponed pending a ruling on such
petition." 56 As one might expect, the parties reached an
agreement to serve as co-lead plaintiffs in the case and no coin
was ever tossed.
While some cases, such as Oxford Health Plans or Vesta Ins.
Group, have resulted in the appointment of an additional, or colead plaintiff, or group of plaintiffs, the ability of the institution
to carry out the role that Congress envisioned has not been
materially diminished, and institutions can still maintain control
over the prosecution of these cases. In addition, a review of more
recent cases addressing the Reform Act's lead plaintiff provisions
confirms that courts are becoming increasingly intolerant of
aggregated groups of unrelated investors as lead plaintiffs. In
Tumolo v. Cymer, Inc.,5 7 the court denied the motion of 339
unrelated investors to be appointed as lead plaintiffs reasoning
that "the expansive number of lead plaintiffs proposed by
Tumolo is inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the
[Reform Act] and would likely threaten the interests of the
purported future class."5 8
The court, recognizing that the
Reform Act was enacted to "encourage a meaningful investor
with a substantial stake in the litigation, preferably a large
institutional investor, to initiate and control the litigation,"59
found that "[a] solitary or small subset of meaningful investors
would likely be a much more appropriate candidate to serve as
lead plaintiff in this case."60
A similar result was met by the proposed lead plaintiffs in
In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation.61 Basing its opinion in part
on an amicus curiae brief submitted by the SEC, the court

56 Id.

57 [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %90,453, at 92,099 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
56 Id. at 92,099.

59 Id. at 92,099.
60 Id.

at 92,100. The court also noted that a "plaintiffs group of 339 members
would make the administration of this action unnecessarily complex and time

consuming." Id. The court had "genuine concerns regarding the degree of control
that a group as broad and diffuse as the one proposed herein would retain over the
attorneys litigating this action." Id.
61 186 F.R.D. 214 (D.D.C. 1999).
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denied an unopposed motion by an aggregated group consisting
of 466 shareholders (represented by a subgroup of 20
shareholders designated by the entire group) for appointment as
lead plaintiff.62 The court found that, based upon the intent of
the Reform Act, a small committee would generally be more
effective and efficient than a larger, aggregated group. 63 The
court also noted that, while the lead plaintiff decision "should be
made under a rule of reason," optimally, a lead plaintiff group
should include no more than three persons and that five or six
should be the upper limit.64 Indeed, the Court in Baan stated:
The mere fact that a proposed lead plaintiff group might have
the largest combined financial stake, however, does not
guarantee client control. A particular concern arises when lead
plaintiff status is sought by a "group" of persons who were
previously unaffiliated, each of whom has suffered modest
losses, and who thus have no demonstrated incentive or ability
to work together to control the litigation. The problem is worse
if the members have been recruited by counsel. It ordinarily
will be the case that such an assemblage will be unable to
65
manage the litigation and control the lawyers.
More recently, the court in Bowman v. Legato Systems,
Inc.,66 denied the motion of an aggregate group of 1,000
shareholders (represented by a subgroup of six shareholders
designated by the entire group) for appointment as lead plaintiff.
Instead, the court appointed the Policeman and Fireman
Retirement System of the City of Detroit, a public pension fund
system that had suffered significant monetary losses, and found
that Detroit "is exactly the type of lead plaintiff envisioned by
67
Congress when it instituted the lead plaintiff requirements."
Rejecting the aggregated group's motion, the court held:
This Court agrees that the phrases "members" and "group of
persons" must be read in the context of the overall scheme and
purpose of the Reform Act. It is beyond dispute that one of the

62 See id.
63 See id.

6 Id.
65 Id. at 224. See also Takeda v. Turbodyne Technologies, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d
1129, 1135 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting Baan and rejecting competing groups comprised
of hundreds of investors, choosing instead to approve alternative of seven
individuals with largest collective losses).
66 195 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
67 Id. at 657.
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Reform Act's primary purposes was to eradicate lawyer-driven
securities fraud class actions. From this fact flows the
inevitable conclusion that the Legato Group is not the type of
"group" which Congress intended to act as lead plaintiff....
The six members of the Legato Group had no pre-existing
relationship. To the contrary, it appears that the members of
the Legato Group were hand picked by [their lawyers] for the
sole purpose of obtaining lead plaintiff status, 6thus conferring
lead plaintiffs counsel status on [their lawyers. 8
There can be little doubt that the SEC's preference for
institutional investors played a role in a recent case in Virginia
where, again, the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief regarding
competing lead plaintiff motions. In Switzenbaum v. Orbital
Sciences Corp.,69 a group of seven individuals, with an aggregate
loss of approximately $857,000, competed with five New York
City pension funds whose losses totaled approximately
$716,000.70 While acknowledging that the group of seven would
be the presumptive lead plaintiffs "[i]f damages alone were the
only relevant consideration," the court rejected the group as
unable to offer adequate representation to the class. 71 In
addition to citing "disorder" within the group's leadership and
other shortcomings, the court expressed concern that the group
had provided little information about the ties the seven members
had to each other or to the putative class. 72 Referring to the SEC
amicus brief, the court rejected, and criticized, the group's
alternative effort to inflate their aggregated losses by including
the losses of approximately 200 other putative class members,
"as if to suggest that all of them could manage the case together
despite the obvious logistical impossibility of doing so." 73 In
68 Id at 658. See also Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853
(S.D. Ind. 1999).
This court agrees that selecting as "lead plaintiff" a large group of
investors who have the largest aggregate losses but who have nothing in
common with one another beyond their investment is not an appropriate
interpretation of the term "group" in the [Reform Act). Such an
interpretation rewards lawyers who solicit plaintiffs and can produce an
unmanageably large group of scores, hundreds, or perhaps even thousands
of "lead plaintiffs."
Id.
6D 187 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Va. 1999).
70 See id. at 249-50.
71 Id. at 250.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 251.
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contrast, the court observed, the New York pension funds
appeared well capable of working together, since the City's office
of corporation counsel was able to monitor the actions of the
74
pension group and its lead counsel.
Similarly, the courts in In re Telxon Corp. Securities
76
Litigation,75 In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation,

and In re Network Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation77 rejected
motions by aggregated lead plaintiff groups. The court in Telxon
rejected the application for lead plaintiff of a group comprised of
eighteen unrelated investors named the "Alsin Group." In
addressing the scope of the term "group," the court noted that a
"group" is "a smaller, identifiable subset of a larger population,
sharing a common, defining characteristic which serves to
distinguish them from that larger population. The word, thus,
means more than a mere random collection of unrelated
individuals or things."78 Applying this definition to the context
of the Reform Act, the court held, "[Tihe context and structure of
the [Reform Act] evince an intent that a "group" consist of more
than a mere assemblage of unrelated persons who share nothing
in common other than the twin fortuities that (1) they suffered
losses and (2) they entered into retainer agreements with the
same attorney or attorneys."79 After rejecting the motion of the
Alsin Group, the Court appointed a group consisting of two
brothers on the ground that "[a] s brothers, [they] obviously have
a pre-existing relationship and a basis for acting as a collective
80

unit."

In the McKesson HBOC litigation, numerous individual
plaintiffs and groups of plaintiffs moved to be appointed lead
plaintiff. As in the Cendant litigation, many of the movants
attempted to carve out niche actions to gain a position as lead
plaintiff.81 The court first addressed the appropriateness of
"group plaintiffs." The court stated that "the real issue is not
whether Congress meant to authorize the aggregation of
unrelated plaintiffs when it passed the Reform Act. It almost

78

See id.
67 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
79 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
In re Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 811.

79

Id. at 813.

74
75
76

77

80 Id. at 813, 823.

81 See In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51.
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certainly did not. The issue is whether the enacted language of
the Reform Act allows such aggregation." 2 The Court then
decided to follow the Telxon court's analysis of the term "group"
in the Reform Act, and held that:
[A] 'group' has a meaningful relationship preceding the
litigation, and is united by more than the mere happenstance of
having bought the same securities. The classic example of such
a group would be a partnership, which has no separate legal
identity, but shares in both assets and liabilities. Other such
groups might be the various subsidiaries of a corporation, or
members of a family.83
Significantly, the court went on to hold that "[iut should be
clear that this narrow construction of 'group of persons'
definitively forecloses appointment of multiple plaintiffs (or
plaintiff 'groups') to serve as 'co-lead' plaintiffs. This would
simply effect an end-run around the Reform Act."8 4 In this
regard, the court found that in determining which movant
should be appointed lead plaintiff it would "construe the various
group motions as alternatively moving to appoint each group's
member with the greatest financial stake in the litigation the
lead plaintiff."85 Ultimately, the court appointed one plaintiff,
the New York State Common Retirement Fund, as sole lead
86
plaintiff.
The court in the Network Associates litigation also rejected
this type of aggregation of shareholders. Indeed, the Network
court specifically stated:
In no case has a court actually designated such an aggregation
as the lead plaintiff. That would be tantamount, given the
hundreds or thousands involved, to letting the class represent
itself. And, there is no way such an assembly could control and
manage counsel. The decisions have flat-out refused to appoint
87
large amalgamations of unrelated persons as lead plaintiff.
In this regard, the court held that:
Artificial aggregation of the type here proposed should never be
allowed for any purpose, including to serve as lead plaintiff or

84

Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1153-54.
Id. at 1154.

85

Id.

82
83

See McKesson HBOC, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
In re Network Assoc., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (internal quotes omitted).
86

87
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to sponsor a subgroup as lead plaintiff. Therefore, the Court
will attempt to identify the single candidate with the largest
financial interest in the litigation and vet that candidate
against the requirements of the [Reform Act].88
Some aggregated groups of would-be lead plaintiffs have
attempted to disqualify certain institutions from serving as lead
plaintiff on the ground that these institutions are "professional
plaintiffs." 9 Specifically, the would-be lead plaintiff groups have
relied upon the section of the Reform Act restricting professional
plaintiffs from serving as lead plaintiffs. That provision, entitled
"Restrictions on Professional Plaintiffs," provides that "[e]xcept
as the Court may otherwise permit, consistent with the purpose
of this section," a person cannot serve as lead plaintiff in five or
more securities class actions during any three year period. 90
The Conference Report to the Reform Act defines
"professional plaintiffs" as those "who own a nominal number of
shares in a wide array of public companies [and who] permit
lawyers readily to file abusive securities class action lawsuits."91
The Conference Report then explicitly states that institutional
investors are not the "professional plaintiffs" whose appointment
as lead plaintiff Congress sought to restrict:
Institutional investors seeking to serve as lead plaintiff may
need to exceed this limitation and do not represent the type of
professional plaintiff this legislation seeks to restrict. As a
result, the Conference Committee grants courts discretion to
avoid the unintended consequences
of disqualifying
institutional investors from serving more than five times in
three years. The Conference Committee does not intend for
this provision to operate at cross purposes with the 'most
92
adequate plaintiff' provision.
Despite the language of the Reform Act and the Conference
Report, two cases have been decided, thus far, in which the "five
times in three years" lead plaintiff restriction has been applied
to institutions.
In In re TeIxon Corporation Securities

88 Id. at 1027 (denying lead plaintiff motions made by aggregated groups each
consisting of thousands of unrelated investors).
89 See McKesson HBOC, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; see also In re Telxon Corp. Sec.
Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1999).

90 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(vi) (1999).
91 CONFERENCE REPORT,
92 See id. at 35.

supra note 2, at 32.
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Litigation,93 a lead plaintiff application by the Florida State
Board of Administration (the "Florida SBA") was denied in part
because the court found that the restriction applied to the
institution, and barred it from serving as a lead plaintiff. The
court found that while there was no authority in the Reform Act
to support a blanket exemption for institutional investors, an
institution seeking to be excused from the five time restriction
must provide the court with a basis to do so without solely
relying on its status as an institution. 94 The basis for the
exemption had to be consistent with the purpose of the act,
namely, to put the control of securities class actions in the hands
of the plaintiff with the greatest financial interest in the relief
sought. The court noted one such basis:
If, for instance, the Court were forced to choose between an
institutional investor that had exceeded the five actions in
three years rule and a single investor whose loss was dwarfed
by that institutional investor, or a group of unrelated investors,
then it certainly would be consistent with the purposes of the
[Reform Act] to allow the institutional investor to serve as lead
plaintiff, finding that the presumption arising under [the
95
restriction] had been adequately rebutted.
Even under this holding, therefore, there are circumstances
under which an institutional investor would be permitted to
serve as lead plaintiff even if it had already served as lead
plaintiff in five securities class actions in three years. In Teixon,
however, the Florida SBA's losses were actually less than the
96
losses of the competing lead plaintiff applicant.
Unfortunately, the flexibility in the Teixon opinion was not
evident in the McKesson HBOC, Inc.97 litigation. There, with
respect to the "five times in three years" restriction, the court
ruled that "[t]he text of the statute contains no flat exemption for
institutional investors."9 8 In that case, the Florida SBA, with
losses of approximately $185 million-at least two and a half
times greater than the losses of any other lead plaintiff
applicant-had joined with the New York State Common
Retirement Fund, the Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement
93 67 F. Supp. 2d at 817, 819-20.
94

See id. at 820-21.

95 Id. at 822.
96 See id. at 822-23.
97

98

In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1156.
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System, and the Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement
Fund of Chicago, to become lead plaintiff.99
The court
disqualified the Florida SBA from serving as a lead plaintiff
because the Florida SBA was currently serving as a lead plaintiff
in six securities fraud class actions. 100
Going beyond the holding in Telxon, the court in McKesson
did not find that the Florida SBA's substantial losses were a
sufficient basis to rebut the presumption against serving as a
lead plaintiff in more that five securities class actions in a threeyear period. In fact, the court found that serving as lead plaintiff
in six class actions was inconsistent with Congress's goal to
increase client control over plaintiff's counsel. 10 1 Finding that
the Florida SBA was not the only lead plaintiff applicant, that
the other lead plaintiff applicants had not served as lead plaintiff
in more securities class actions than the Florida SBA, and that
the Florida SBA was not the only institutional investor applying
for the lead plaintiff appointment, the court held that there were
no "special circumstances" present to overcome the presumptive
bar. 0 2
CONCLUSION

Just as it would have been difficult for anyone to have
predicted the success that a company such as Yahoo! would
enjoy, no one would have thought, prior to the passage of the
Reform Act, that institutions would be vested with the power
and opportunity to control the securities litigation landscape,
which has, unquestionably, been changed by the lead plaintiff
provisions of the Reform Act. The recent settlements of the
Cendant litigation by the Public Pension Fund Group highlight
the impact that institutions can (and will) have in the securities
class action arena. Just how much the securities landscape has
changed, however, remains to be seen, for who knows whether
institutional investors' zeal will accelerate or diminish in time.
Or, for that matter, how courts will continue to rule on the
thorny questions surrounding selection of a lead plaintiff where
there are competing groups.

99 See id. at 1154.
100 See id. at 1156.
101 See id.
102

See id. at 1156-57.
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